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Space-efficient Verifiable Secret Sharing
Using Polynomial Interpolation
Massimo Cafaro*, Senior Member, IEEE and Piergiuseppe Pelle`
Abstract—Preserving data confidentiality in clouds is a key issue. Secret Sharing, a cryptographic primitive for the distribution
of a secret among a group of n participants designed so that only subsets of shareholders of cardinality 0 < t ≤ n are allowed
to reconstruct the secret by pooling their shares, can help mitigating and minimizing the problem. A desirable feature of Secret
Sharing schemes is cheater detection, i.e. the ability to detect one or more malicious shareholders trying to reconstruct the
secret by obtaining legal shares from the other shareholders while providing them with fake shares. Verifiable Secret Sharing
schemes solve this problem by allowing shareholders verifying the others’ shares. We present new verification algorithms
providing arbitrary secret sharing schemes with cheater detection capabilities, and prove their space efficiency with regard
to other schemes appeared in the literature. We also introduce, in one of our schemes, the Exponentiating Polynomial Root
Problem (EPRP), which is believed to be NP-Intermediate and therefore difficult.
Index Terms—Security and Privacy Protection, Cryptographic controls, Verification
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
S ECRET Sharing deals with the problem of securelydistributing confidential information among a cer-
tain number of shareholders, in such a way that only
some subsets of them are able to jointly decrypt it.
Several schemes and variants of secret sharing have
been proposed, from the seminal schemes of Shamir
[1] and Blakley [2], which are based respectively
on polynomial interpolation, and hyperplanes inter-
section, to the newest approaches closely involving
number theory, such as the ones based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem [3] [4].
Secret Sharing can be beneficial in many different
ways in cloud computing, which is becoming in-
creasingly common, with rapid adoption by both
industry, small and medium enterprises, and indi-
vidual users. Among the many services provided by
a cloud infrastructure, we are concerned here with
cloud storage and file hosting services. Building on
a highly virtualized infrastructure, these services are
succeeding owing to economic reasons and to the
fact that the underlying infrastructure and physical
location are fully transparent to the user. However,
preserving data confidentiality in clouds is a key issue
[5]. The main difficulty is related to the fact that data
is stored on a remote server which is fully accessible
by the cloud service provider (and can be accessible
to third-party people through a malicious attack). In
order to achieve data confidentiality and to overcome
this issue, it is possible to encrypt a file containing
sensitive information before storing it on a cloud.
• The authors are with the Department of Engineering for Innovation,
University of Salento, Lecce 73100, Italy
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Even though encryption makes harder unauthorized
disclosure of information, a better solution is based
on the use of Secret Sharing and multiple cloud
providers, a scenario in which each generated share is
stored on a different cloud. The original file can still
be encrypted if required, thus providing an additional
security guarantee. The use of multiple clouds and
Secret Sharing can therefore mitigate and minimize
several risks associated to the single cloud provider
scenario, such as service availability failure, data
loss and/or corruption, loss of confidentiality, vendor
lock-in and the possibility of malicious insiders in the
single cloud.
One important issue in the design of a secret sharing
protocol is its robustness against cheaters: common
solutions proposed in the literature rely on checking
consistency of the secret information after reconstruc-
tion from more than one group of shareholders, or
on adding helpful data to the shares in order to de-
tect and/or identify mistrustful behaviour. Verifiable
Secret Sharing (VSS) [6] is therefore secret sharing
augmented with features that allow only detection
or also identification of any cheater in a coalition,
unconditionally or with respect to the scheme pa-
rameters (threshold value, total number of dishonest
shareholders, etc.). Several VSS schemes have been
proposed, including, for instance, Publicly Verifiable
Secret Sharing (PVSS) [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] or
schemes focusing on Asynchronous Verifiable Secret
Sharing (AVSS) such as [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19].
In this work, we present new verification algorithms
based on commitments providing arbitrary secret
sharing schemes with cheater detection capabilities,
and prove their data efficiency with regard to other
schemes appeared in the literature. Our approach
belongs to the Honest-Dealer VSS scheme category
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[20] [21], since it requires a one-time honest dealer.
Our contribution is three-fold: (i) we present space-
efficient verification protocols that does not even
require storing public data for verification; (ii) our
schemes can be used in conjunction with arbitrary
secret sharing schemes, and provide cheater detec-
tion capabilities; (iii) we also introduce, in one of
our schemes, a new computational problem, namely
the Exponentiating Polynomial Root Problem (EPRP),
which generalizes the Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 recalls related work. We present our space-
efficient verifiable schemes and analyze their security
in Section 3, along with EPRP. In Section 4, we pro-
pose runtime efficiency refinements to optimize our
schemes. The information rates of our schemes are
discussed in Section 5, in which we also compare our
schemes against the state of the art schemes published
in the literature. Finally, we draw our conclusions and
propose future work in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
In this Section, we discuss related work. We begin by
reviewing commitments, and then proceed analyzing
hashing, the schemes based on homomorphic com-
mitments proposed by Feldman [22], Pedersen [23]
and Benaloh [24] and the set coherence verification
method, introduced by Harn and Lin [25].
A commitment [26] is a statement that proves
knowledge of some information, without revealing the
information itself. A formal definition follows:
Definition 2.1 (Commitment). Given a value x, a com-
mitment c(x) is a value such that the following conditions
are satisfied:
• Hiding: By knowledge of c(x), it is impossible (or very
difficult) to obtain x — c(x) hides x;
• Binding: It is infeasible or impossible to find another
value y for which c(y) = c(x) — c(x) binds to x.
The two properties just defined may refer to the
computational or to the unconditional security setting: if
an attacker with infinite computing power can break
the former or the latter, the scheme is said to be,
respectively, computationally hiding or computationally
binding. Otherwise, a commitment scheme is said to be
unconditionally hiding or unconditionally binding. More
precisely, it can be proved [27] that a commitment
scheme cannot be simultaneously unconditionally hid-
ing and unconditionally binding. Commitments can be
implemented via one-way functions, as a basis for
verification schemes.
2.1 Hashing
The simplest method to add verification capabilities
to a scheme, is to use one-way functions to obtain
fingerprints/signatures of the data involved. Two
trivial algorithms for detection and identification are
listed (suppose that H is a secure hash function):
Detection
Dealer: Given the secret s, compute h = H(s) and
make it public.
Shareholder: After reconstructing a secret x, verify
whether H(x) = h. If H(x) 6= h someone is cheating.
Identification
Dealer: Given the shares s1, . . . , sn, compute the sig-
natures hi = H(si) for every i and make them public.
Shareholder: Before performing reconstruction, for
every share sj received, get hj and check that
H(sj) = hj . If equality does not hold, then share-
holder j is cheating.
The clear disadvantage of identification by hashing
is that verification data grows linearly with n.
2.2 Homomorphic commitments: Feldman’s
scheme
Feldman’s scheme [22] is a verification method ap-
plicable to Shamir’s secret sharing. Like hashing, it
relies on the use of one-way functions for verifying
consistency of each share. Moreover, the homomor-
phic property is exploited in order to decrease the
total number of verification elements from n to t
– the commitment is over the secret, not over the
shares. Indeed, let v be a (+, ·)-homomorphic one-
way function (that is, v(a+ b) = v(a)v(b)); then, if v is
evaluated over a polynomial, the following equation
holds:
v
(
t−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)
=
t−1∏
i=0
v
(
ax
i
i
)
(1)
The scheme steps are reported below:
• Choose as public values primes p, q such that q
divides p − 1 and a generator α of a subgroup
of order q of Z∗p (q is the lowest possible integer
such that αq ≡ 1 mod p); the bitsize of q is much
lower than the one of p, and this is done since not
only finding primitive roots, but even computing
multiplicative orders for generic moduli, are, in
general, hard problems (random sampling and
factorization of the modulus are used for better
efficiency). Theoretically, one could also choose a
generator of order p− 1;
• Starting with the secret a0, generate the polyno-
mial:
P (x) = a0 + . . .+ at−1x
t−1
over the field Zq , from which the shares are
sampled as si = P (i), i = 1, . . . , n;
• Generate the public verification coefficients:
αj = α
aj mod p, j = 0, . . . , t− 1
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• Thanks to the homomorphic property of expo-
nentiation, a commitment to a share si can be
written as:
αsi = αP (i) = αa0+a1i+...+at−1i
t−1
= αa0αa1 i . . . αat−1 i
t−1
= α0α
i
1 . . . α
it−1
t−1 (2)
Hence, the consistency of a share si can be veri-
fied by checking the equality:
αsi ≡
t−1∏
j=0
αi
j
j (mod p) (3)
It is worth noting here that the one-way function
candidate used here is modular exponentiation over
Z
∗
p.
Feldman’s scheme is computationally hiding, since
exponentiation is done over the secret polynomial’s
coefficients, so solving the DLP would allow to obtain
the secret from the verification data (reverse hiding).
It is also unconditionally binding since the mapping
between values and commitments is injective, so mul-
tiple values committing to the same output cannot be
found.
2.3 Homomorphic commitments: Pedersen’s
scheme
With some slight modifications, proposed in [23], the
previous scheme can be made perfectly hiding and
computationally binding – notice also that informa-
tion rate grows, as there is more data to provide
shareholders with.
• Choose as public parameters primes p and q as
before, together with two generators of order q,
namely g, h;
• Let y(x) = a0 + a1x+ . . .+ at−1x
t−1 be the poly-
nomial to be committed. Generate an additional
polynomial z(x) of the same degree, with random
non-null coefficients b0, . . . , bt−1;
• Compute the coefficients commitments as
ci = g
aihbi mod p and send them to every
shareholder;
• Sample the points for shareholder j as
yj = y(j), zj = z(j), then the share for
shareholder j is (yj, zj);
• As in the previous scheme, by applying the ho-
momorphic property, a commitment to a share
(yj , zj) can be expressed as:
gyjhzj = g
t−1∑
i=0
aij
i
h
t−1∑
i=0
bij
i
=
t−1∏
i=0
(gai)j
i
·
t−1∏
i=0
(
hbi
)ji
=
t−1∏
i=0
(
gaihbi
)ji
=
t−1∏
i=0
ci
ji (4)
Thus, any shareholder can verify that a share
(yj , zj) is valid, by checking the equation:
gyjhzj ≡
t−1∏
i=0
ci
ji (mod p) (5)
Perfect hiding for a commitment gahb means that,
for any triple a, b, a′, a value b′ exists such that
gahb ≡ ga
′
hb
′
(mod p). This can be seen by expressing
h as a power of g: h = gw mod p, and it can always
be done since h ∈ Z∗p. A commitment can then be
expressed as:
c = ga+wb mod p (6)
Hence, by fixing the triple defined before, b′ can be
found by solving:
a+ wb ≡ a′ + wb′ (mod p) (7)
which is always well-defined.
2.4 Homomorphic commitments: Benaloh’s
scheme
This scheme [24] allows shareholders verifying that
all of the shares are collectively t–consistent (i.e., an
arbitrary subset t of n shares yields the same, correct,
polynomial without revealing the secret). Verification
is done through homomorphic algebra, without ex-
posing the secret. However, the scheme requires an
interactive proof to prove the dealer’s integrity, which
has been avoided by design in our scheme. Moreover,
the proof involves the generation and use of a very
large number of polynomials of degree t for a (t, n)
threshold scheme, making the scheme impractical.
2.5 Verifiability by set coherence
This method, introduced in [25], does not require any
additional verification data besides the shares them-
selves. However, when applied to a (t, n)-threshold
scheme, it needs a coalition consisting ofm sharehold-
ers, m > t. Cheater detection and identification are
performed by comparing the secrets reconstructed by
all of the possible subsets of t out of m shareholders.
The two algorithms follow.
Detection
• Let B be an authorized subset of size m > t for a
(t, n)-threshold scheme. For every subset A ⊂ B
of size t, run the reconstruction algorithm with
the corresponding shares. Keep a histogram of
all of the secrets found;
• If every subset A ⊂ B rebuilds the same secret,
there is no cheating. Otherwise, run the cheater
identification algorithm.
Identification
• Select the majority secret sm as the one with the
highest frequency in the histogram. Assume it to
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TABLE 1
Set coherence: bounds for detection and identification
Independent cheaters Organized cheaters
Detection m > t m− c > t
Identification m− c > t m− c ≥ c+ t
be the actual secret (remember that this requires a
honest majority). Take a subset A that rebuilds
sm (this can be done in constant time, if the
histogram structure keeps track of which subsets
rebuild each secret);
• Let A = {1, 2, . . . , t} without loss of generality.
Since A rebuilds the correct secret by assumption,
then every share in A is posted by a honest
shareholder, and every possible cheater must be
contained in C = B/A;
• For every shareholder j ∈ C, check whether the
set A′ = {j, 2, . . . , t} rebuilds sm. If it does not,
add shareholder j to the cheater’s list; again,
this can be done in constant time, using the
augmented histogram of first step.
Distinguishing between independent cheaters and
organized ones, the bounds for detection and iden-
tification are summarized in Table 1 (c denotes the
number of cheaters, m the cardinality of B, t the
threshold value).
Remark. Besides requesting a higher threshold value for
the underlying secret sharing scheme, this verification
method presents sub-exponential complexity, in a space
versus time trade-off:
• The time complexity of checking all t-subsets is
O(
(
m
t
)
), which is super-polynomial in m.
• Using the augmented histogram, also space complexity
becomes O(
(
m
t
)
).
However, in all practical applications of secret sharing, the
maximum number of shareholders n, and therefore, m and
t, are values of order 101, so the above considerations can
be, in practice, disregarded.
3 SPACE-EFFICIENT VERIFIABILITY
In this Section, we introduce our construction of a
new verification method for threshold secret sharing.
It is not designed for a particular scheme, nor does
it require any assumption on the shares. The de-
signed verification algorithm is non-interactive (ver-
ification does not require receiving additional data
from other shareholders, besides the shares), requires
a one-time honest dealer, and belongs to the family
of commitment-based methods, since it relies on one-
way functions. It will be shown that, under certain
hypotheses, it is more space-efficient than the already
illustrated homomorphic VSS extensions.
3.1 Definitions
Notations related to mathematical and string opera-
tors are listed below. The following convention will
be used: any operator defined for a bitstring is valid
for an unsigned integer type, and vice-versa.
• [s1|s2| . . . |sn] defines the concatenation of the bit-
strings s1, s2, . . . , sn;
• bs() denotes the bitsize of its argument. If the
argument is an integer n, the bitsize is bs(n) =
1 + ⌊log2n⌋.
If the argument is a set, the operator refers to the
greatest element in the set: bs(S) = bs(maxx∈S x).
Eg.: If s = 111012 and S = {5, 7, 111}, then
bs(s) = 5 and bs(S) = bs(111) = 7;
• M(y) denotes the bitstring consisting of the most
significant
⌈
n
2
⌉
bits of the n-bit string y. For ex-
ample, if s = 111012, M(s) = 1112. L(y) denotes
the bitstring consisting of the less significant
⌊
n
2
⌋
bits of the bitstring y. Referring to the previous
example, L(s) = 012 = 12.
Clearly, for any string s, s = [M(s)|L(s)] – leading
zeros in L(s), if present, must be kept for a correct
concatenation;
• NP (x) and np(x) refer respectively to the lowest
prime number strictly greater than x and to the
lowest prime greater than or equal to x.
Eg.: NP (22) = np(22) = 23, while NP (11) = 13
and np(11) = 11.
We recall here some definitions and useful results
about permutations.
Definition 3.1 (Permutation). Given a set I =
{1, . . . , n}, a permutation over I is a bijective mapping
σ : I → I . That is, every element of I maps to one
(not necessarily different) element of I itself, and no two
different elements can map to the same one.
Lemma 3.1 (Permutation over a probability distribu-
tion).
Let σ : A → B be a permutation, with A =
{1, . . . , n} , B = {σ(1), . . . , σ(n)}; let fa : A → [0, 1]
define a probability distribution1 for the random variable
XA over the set A, i.e.:
PA(XA = i) = fA(i), i ∈ A
Then, the distribution obtained by applying the permuta-
tion σ to the PMF fA is given by the set of probabilities
that the random variable XB takes over the permuted items
of the set B:
σ(PA(XA = i)) = PB(XB = σ(i))
An immediate corollary of this is that the uniform
distribution maps to itself under every possible per-
mutation:
σ(fU (i)) = fU(σ(i)) ∀σ : A→ B
1. Probability Mass Function (PMF)
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Lemma 3.2 (Composition of permutations). The space
of permutation matrices of size n (Σn×n) is a group under
matrix product, hence permutations over input sets of equal
size are closed under composition:
∀σi, σj ∈ Σ
n×n, σi(σj) ∈ Σ
n×n
Lemma 3.3. Let GF (q) be a finite field of prime size (not
a polynomial field), r one of its primitive roots, and D =
{1, . . . , q − 1}. Then, the exponentiation function:
er : D → D , er(x) = r
x mod q
is a permutation over D.
The following result, related to the degree of an in-
terpolating polynomial with regard to its interpolation
points, will be used in the Powering polynomial (VSS-
POW) scheme.
Theorem 3.4. Let (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , t be a set of t random
points with different abscissas xi, and whose coordinates
belong to a finite field F of prime cardinality p; let y(x) =
t−1∑
i=0
aix
i be the interpolating polynomial of the given points,
with coefficients over F as well. Then, the probability that
the degree of the polynomial y is strictly less than t− 1 is
negligible for big p:
P [deg(y) < t− 1] =
1
p
Proof: Any set of points chosen following the
given assumption, generates a full-rank Vandermonde
matrixX ∈ Ft×t, which induces a bijection of the finite
domain Ft onto itself:
∀y ∈ Ft ∃! a ∈ Ft : Xa = y
for this reason, X can be seen as a permutation of the
elements of Ft. By Lemma 3.1, the uniform discrete
distribution is invariant with respect to permutations,
so the probability of obtaining a polynomial of non-
maximum degree – with at−1 = 0 – is equal to the
one of choosing the t-th point with null ordinate2:
P [y(x) : at−1 = 0] = P [yt = 0] =
1
p
3.2 Designing a space-efficient VSS extension
The verification scheme that is going to be designed
will be the result of incremental refinements of par-
tially secure techniques. The main goal to achieve
during the design will be the reduction of verification
2. Notice that this does not mean that a point with null ordinate
generates a solution awith a null coefficient, but that the cardinality
of all points with the first property is equal to the one of polynomi-
als with the second property; since domains coincide, probabilities
are equal as well. Also note that the point index is not relevant, t-th
point has just been chosen in order to fix a position, to distinguish
from the case when any one of the points could have a null y-
coordinate, which would lead to a wrong probability calculation.
data. Labels of the form VSS-X will be used to better
identify and distinguish the variants obtained. More-
over, since the final result is a commitment scheme,
the security analysis will develop around the two
security properties of hiding and binding.
3.3 Security assumptions
• There is a single, one-time, honest dealer, that dis-
tributes data to all of the n shareholders involved
in the scheme instance;
• There is no trusted shareholder in the underlying
network, and no storage of shared or public data.
That is, once provided with their shares and
verification data, shareholders do not need any
other information for secret reconstruction and
cheater identification;
• Secure bidirectional channels can be established
between pairs of entities - any external attacker
can only be passive, so man-in-the-middle attacks
are not considered in this model; security against
these kinds of attack is assumed to be addressed
by the protocols that establish communication
between the parties over a network (e.g., TLS);
• Client machines are fully trusted. All of the en-
tities (the dealer and the shareholders) run their
respective protocol steps on their client machines
where keys and certificates required for encryp-
tion/decryption and authentication are stored. If
a CSP (Cloud Service Provider) has to be used
for share storage, shareholders may encrypt their
shares using a symmetric cipher before uploading
them. Similarly, shareholders download shares
from CSPs to their clients and decrypt them (if
needed) before engaging in secret reconstruction
and cheater identification;
• CSPs are semi-trusted and modeled as Honest-
But-Curious adversaries. Therefore, they act ac-
cording to their prescribed actions in all of the
protocols they are involved in (they do not, as
malicious users do, try to alter stored data and
communications), but it is assumed that CSPs
are interested in learning the contents of shares
stored by shareholders, and can fully access ev-
erything stored on their cloud storage infrastruc-
ture.
3.4 Design features
The main features our design attempts will insist on,
are summarized below:
• Commitments on shares: Verification routines
ensure that shares are legal independently from the
secret they are generated from, unlike homomor-
phic commitment schemes, that guarantee that a
share corresponds to some secret;
• Non-interactivity: Verification algorithms can be
carried out in one interaction, that is, no further
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communication with other parties is required
after receiving the shares;
• Private verification: each shareholder is able to
verify the others’ shares, but not its one: this
is not necessary since this interaction model as-
sumes a one-time honest dealer; moreover, ver-
ification is performed differently by each share-
holder, by taking as additional input a secret
parameter.
3.5 Powering polynomial (VSS-POW)
Let S be a generic secret sharing scheme instance,
with shares si, i = 1, . . . , n belonging to some natural
domain D = {0, 1, . . . , q} and bs(D) = bs(q) the
domain’s bitsize. The following is a non-interactive
VSS extension based on polynomial interpolation. The
dealer is in charge of doing the following steps:
• Choose a suitable finite field F for domain D: for
example, GF (NP (q)) or GF (2bs(q));
• Generate with Lagrange interpolation a polyno-
mial V (x) over F that maps the chosen shares to
their powers with a random exponent r ∈ F, and
make it public to all of the shareholders, i.e.:
V (si) = s
r
i , i = 1, . . . , n (8)
With high probability, deg(V ) = n− 1 (see Theo-
rem 3.4), so there will be n coefficients to provide
shareholders with.
A shareholder can verify the provided share by
checking if it satisfies (8).
The bitsize of each coefficient is bounded by bs(q),
if the field chosen is GF (2bs(q)), and by bs(q) + 1 if
F = GF (NP (q)) (in the worst case, when NP (q) ≥
2bs(q)). Hence, like the hashing method, this approach
suffers from a share expansion which is linear in the
total number of shares generated. For example, by
applying this VSS extension to a distributed-equations
Shamir scheme with no public data, and considering
as inputs to be verified si = [xi|yi], the augmented
share of each shareholder (reconstruction data + ver-
ification data) will be:
xi, yi, v0, . . . , vn−1
where vi denotes the i-th coefficient of the verification
polynomial. The total size is bounded by bs(q) +
n(bs(q) + 1).
3.5.1 Security analysis
Theoretically, the proposed scheme could not be con-
sidered secure for hiding, in that shares can be discov-
ered by finding the roots of the polynomial equation:
V (x)− xr = 0 (9)
Algorithms that are polynomial-time in the input
polynomial’s degree exist for this task, such as
Berlekamp [28], Cantor-Zassenhaus, and Shoup [29].
For details about their asymptotic runtime complexity,
see [30]. Notice however that, for VSS-POW, being the
degree of V (x) − xr exponential in the field bitsize,
this scheme could be considered, on average, compu-
tationally hiding, if r is chosen randomly. In addition,
it may happen that V (x) = xr admits other solutions
than the actual shares: again, if they exist, they are
found by factorization and extraction of linear factors,
therefore binding is, at least, only computational.
3.6 Verification by CRT solution is not efficient
One may be tempted to try the same approach by
using the solution of a remainder system, instead of
the coefficients of a polynomial. For example, if the
shares generated are s1, . . . , sn, verification data could
be a value x such that:
x ≡
⌊si
2
⌋
(mod s)i
for every i = 1, . . . , n, and verification would be
performed by checking that each share received satis-
fies the corresponding equation. However, in order to
have a unique solution, Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) requires the moduli of the system to be pairwise
coprime: this imposes a restriction on the possible
shares that can be verified. It is not feasible as well
to regenerate new shares until they are all coprimes
among themselves, for two reasons:
• Computational efficiency: As a corollary of the
Prime Number Theorem [31], the probability that
two integers sampled from the uniform discrete
distribution U [2, N ] are coprimes tends to 6/pi2 as
N goes to infinity [32]. This probability decreases
super-polynomially as the number of values in
which any pair should contain coprime numbers
grows [33]. In principle, this could not really
be a limitation, since a set of pairwise coprime
numbers can be generated recursively starting
with two numbers, and using trial and error
methods together with repeated instances of the
Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) algorithm;
• Space efficiency: a worse issue prevents using the
CRT-solution approach to obtain a VSS scheme:
for what has just been stated, the density of sets
of n pairwise coprime values is very low for a
given power set P over a domain, so the scheme
instances would need an over-dimensioning in
order to result secure to search attacks (when
they are possible), in that an attacker would
not need to check every possible set of integers,
but only the groups of mutually coprime ones,
which become very few with respect to the search
domain as n increases.
3.7 String-split polynomial (VSS-SSP)
The verifying-polynomial method introduced before
can be modified in order to decrease the domain size
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of each coefficient, and so the maximum size of each
verification element. Consider the complete set of
shares S = {s1, . . . , sn} of a generic threshold scheme,
with domain D and share sizes bs(si) ≤ bs(D). The
distribution/verification algorithm under domain
reduction should run as follows:
Dealer’s steps
• Take the bitsize limit of any share, bs(D), and
select the finite field for verification accordingly:
F = GF (NP (2
bs(D)
2 )) or F = GF (2
bs(D)
2 ) ;
• For every share si, if bs(si) < bs(D), obtain with
zero-padding on the left the modified share Si
such that bs(Si) = bs(D). Otherwise, let Si = si;
• Compute the two halves of the bitstring Si as
SiM = M(Si) and SiL = L(Si);
• Check that no two SiM are equal. If so, run the
share generation algorithm again and go to the
first step;
• Interpolate the verification polynomial over F as
V (x) such that:
V (SiM ) = SiL, i = 1, . . . , n (10)
• Broadcast the polynomial coefficients
v0, . . . , vn−1.
Upon receiving a share si, any shareholder
can verify it by padding it to Si and checking if
V (SiM ) = SiL.
3.7.1 Security analysis: no binding
This initial attempt is completely insecure against
binding, since any one knowing V can choose a
random half string a, and provide the faked share
s′ = [a|V (a)]. However, it is a good starting point
for reducing the size of verification data, and it can
be made secure in combination with other approaches
presented later.
3.8 Enforcing binding: private verification
Binding security can be enhanced, by making each
of the n shareholders verify the others’ shares, and
assigning a different, private security parameter uj
to each verifier; in this environment, this would
mean generating n different polynomials, one for each
shareholder, satisfying the equation:
Vj(x) = x
uj , i = 1, . . . , n , i 6= j (11)
for the first method, or
Vj(M(x)) = L(x)
uj , i = 1, . . . , n , i 6= j (12)
for the second one. In other words, every shareholder
would own a polynomial passing for the other share-
holders’ shares (or half-shares).
3.8.1 Security analysis
Possible attacks against VSS-POW with private veri-
fication are listed below:
• If n − 1 organized cheaters conspire against the
remaining shareholder, by applying polynomial
GCD to V1(x)− x
u1 , . . . , Vn−1(x)−x
un−1 , they can
obtain the missing share sn, since every poly-
nomial other than Vn passes by sn. Clearly, this
attack does not result in a true gain, unless the
threshold scheme to be protected is a (n, n) one.
We note here that this attack can be performed
on the original VSS-POW scheme as well;
• The same attack works for unhiding a missing
share from a string-split polynomial. This time,
after GCD, the factor retrieved will lead toM(sn),
then the missing half-share can be retrieved by
taking the uj-th root of any available Vj(M(sn))
– efficient extraction of modular n-th roots can be
performed using a generalization of the Tonelli-
Shanks algorithm [34].
However, like polynomial factorization algorithms,
the polynomial variant of GCD requires polynomial-
time in the input degree, which is exponential in the
field’s bitsize; therefore, this scheme is as secure
against hiding as the one without private verification.
3.9 Exponentiating polynomial (VSS-EXP)
The variant that is going to be introduced now, will
exploit some of the characteristics of the attempts
made before, and a security assumption, in order to
achieve computational security.
Let s1, . . . , sn be the input shares, and
D = {0, 1, . . . , q} and bs(D) = bs(q) their domain
and domain’s bitsize, respectively. The dealer is in
charge of doing the following steps:
• Choose a suitable finite field F, such as
GF (NP (q)) or GF (2bs(q));
• For each shareholder j, select a primitive element
rj of the multiplicative group F
∗, and generate
with Lagrange interpolation a polynomial Vj(x)
over F that exponentiates all of the other shares
through rj
3:
Vj(si) = rj
si , i = 1, . . . , n , i 6= j (13)
• Send q, rj and the coefficients of Vj to shareholder
j via a secure private channel.
A shareholder can verify the provided share by
checking if it satisfies (13).
3. Notice that, while for prime order fields GF (p) this equation
is well-posed, for prime power fields GF (pk) we are performing
a small abuse of notation: si in the left-hand side of the formula
is the element of the field (which is, actually, a polynomial), while
the exponent on the right-hand side represents the natural number
corresponding to the bitstring si, since, in finite field algebra,
exponentiation by a polynomial is not defined.
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3.9.1 Security analysis
The security of this scheme relies on the following
assumption.
Definition 3.2 (Exponentiating Polynomial Root Prob-
lem (EPRP)).
Let p(x) be a polynomial with deg(p) ≥ 0 with coefficients
drawn from a finite field GF (q), and r a primitive element
for that field. Then, the problem of finding roots of:
p(x) = rx (14)
is believed to be NP–intermediate, i.e., it is in the com-
plexity class NP but it is supposed not to be in P nor
NP–complete.
It is worth noting that this problem is at least as
hard as the DLP, in that it can be seen as a gener-
alization of the latter – DLP is the particular case of
EPRP when deg(p) = 0 – so a poly-time algorithm
for solving EPRP would imply solution to any DLP
instance. The problem is in NP , owing to the fact that,
given a solution, verifying it consists in performing
a number of modular additions, multiplications and
exponentiations, which is linear in the number of
coefficients; the runtime of this arithmetic is instead
polynomial with respect to the field bitsize. To the
best of our knowledge, as of this writing, efficient
algorithms to solve this problem do not exist. Finding
roots to such equations can be done in two ways:
• Try all possible items x in the field, and check
whether they satisfy the equation or not. Clearly,
even with randomized search, this requires expo-
nential time in the bitsize of the field modulus;
• The exponential rx can be rewritten in
polynomial form, by using Lagrange
interpolation to interpolate the points
{(0, r0), (1, r1), . . . , (q − 1, rq−1)}, determining a
polynomial f(x). This polynomial is identical to
rx precisely because we are working on a finite
field. Then, the difference p(x) − f(x), can be
factored in order to find the roots of the given
equation (using Berlekamp, Cantor–Zassenhaus
or Shoup algorithms) and the roots read off the
factors. However, this approach is even worse
than exhaustive search: since, on average, a
polynomial passing by n given points will have
n non-null coefficients, even only the input to
Lagrange interpolation will require exponential
space in the field bitsize. Also, notice that, in this
case, there is no space-time tradeoff: Lagrange
interpolation is an algorithm that uses entirely its
input: this means that, for instances with inputs
requiring exponential space, runtime would be
exponential as well.
The security of this scheme can be summarized as
follows:
• Reverse hiding: A dishonest shareholder will-
ing to obtain all of the others’ shares from his
verification polynomial, should try, on average,
about 2bs(q) values4. Also, notice that the equation
may present additional roots other than the valid
shares: if this happens, an unbounded adversary
could exploit the set coherence method (2.5), and
obtain the secret as the majority value, without
caring about which solutions are legal or not;
• Reverse binding: since no one except shareholder
j knows the primitive element rj used in the
construction of Vj , in order to be able to deceive
a verification equation, rj must be guessed, and
the equation must present additional solutions.
For commitments in which the equation has only
roots in the valid values, binding is perfect.
3.10 String-split exponentiating polynomial (VSS-
EXP-SSP)
The string-split approach can be applied to VSS-EXP
to reduce the total amount of data targeted to each
shareholder. It will be proved that, by keeping the as-
sumption made, security of this scheme is equivalent
to the original one’s. The dealer is in charge of doing
the following steps:
• Given the set of shares S, choose a suitable
field F for half-shares M(si), L(si) as GF (2
w) or
GF (NP (2w)), with w =
⌈
bs(S)
2
⌉
an upper bound
on the shares’ half sizes;
• For each shareholder j, select a primitive element
rj of F
∗, and generate with Lagrange interpola-
tion a polynomial Vj(x) over F such that:
Vj(M(si)) = rj
L(si), i = 1, . . . , n , i 6= j (15)
• Send w, rj and the coefficients of Vj to share-
holder j via a secure private channel.
A shareholder can verify the provided share by
checking if it satisfies (15).
3.10.1 Security equivalence
This scheme has the same security properties of VSS-
EXP, under the same assumptions.
Theorem 3.5. Let V1 and V2 be two instances of VSS-
EXP and VSS-EXP-SSP respectively, with the shares domain
bitsize for V1 being half the one for V2. The two instances
are stochastically equivalent for hiding and binding.
Proof: Shares can be considered random bitstrings
sampled from the domain {0, 1}b. A random bitstring
of size b – suppose b even, without loss of generality –
can be seen as concatenation of two random bitstrings
of size b′ = b2 . Suppose n b-bitstrings are chosen
4. Given a domain of N strings, k of which representing valid
shares, the expected number of trials for the k–th success when
sampling without replacement (i.e. finding all of the shares via a
randomized exhaustive brute-force attack), is k(N + 1)/(k + 1), a
value rapidly approaching N .
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uniformly; the probability of not extracting the same
string twice is:(
2b − 1
2b
)(
2b − 2
2b
)
. . .
(
2b − n+ 1
2b
)
=
(2b − 1)!
(2b − n)!2b(n−1)
Analogously, the probability of choosing n b-bitstrings
si such that no two M(si) are equal, and, indepen-
dently, no two L(si) are equal, is given by:(
(2
b
2 − 1)!
(2
b
2 − n)!2
b
2 (n−1)
)2
Clearly, fixing n, both probabilities approach 1 as b
grows large.
Since both strings and half-strings are supposed
to be extracted from a random uniform process, for
proving stochastic equivalence it is sufficient to prove
that solving the VSS-EXP equation:
V (x) = rx (16)
is statistically as hard as solving the equation:
V (x1) = r
x2 (17)
where x, x1, x2 belong to the same domain D (or at
least to domains with the same bitsize).
Indeed, this is true for the following reasons:
• Suppose that all of the x1 and, independently,
all of the x2 values chosen for interpolation are
different: this is practically always true, given the
probabilities defined before; then, a permutation
σ1 : D → D exists, mapping each x1 to one and
only one x2;
• By Lemma 3.3, exponentiation rx defines another
permutation σ2 : D → D, if we exclude from D
the value 0; again, the probability of extracting at
least one 0 value for any x1 or x2 is negligible, if
b is sufficiently large;
• (17) can be rewritten as:
V (x1) = r
σ1(x1) = σ2(σ1(x1)) (18)
Since, from Lemma 3.1, the uniform distribution
holds invariance with respect to permutations
(and also compositions of permutations, by clo-
sure of the permutation group – Lemma 3.2), the
equation of VSS-EXP presents an equivalent dis-
tribution of solutions of VSS-EXP-SSP, provided
input domains are equal or similar in size. Then,
if the EPRP assumption is valid, the two schemes
are cryptographically equivalent.
4 RUNTIME EFFICIENCY REFINEMENTS
The VSS-EXP family requires computation of random
primitive elements, in order for exponentiation to
span over the whole multiplicative group of interest.
The efficiency refinements presented here will refer to
prime order fields GF (p). Some special cases of com-
fortable prime power fields of binary form, GF (2n),
will be presented later.
Given a prime p and the modular multiplicative
group Z∗p = {1, . . . , p− 1}, a primitive root for that
group is a generator whose order is p − 1. Since no
efficient algorithms exist for finding primitive roots
modulo a prime, random trial-and-error methods are
used:
• Choose a random number r from the uniform
distribution {2, . . . , p− 1}; note that 1 is only a
generator of the trivial group {1}, since 1x is
always 1 for any x, so it can never be a primitive
root for non-trivial groups;
• Compute the multiplicative order of r: if it is
equal to p−1, stop; otherwise, go to the previous
step.
However, even computing multiplicative orders is,
in general, a hard problem:
• Any number a in the multiplicative group Z∗p
must have as order a divisor of p − 1; so, the
standard trial-and-error technique here consists
in evaluating ad mod p for all of the divisors of
p−1, and taking as result the minimum argument
d for which ad ≡ 1 (mod p);
• If p−1 is hard to factor, for example, if p−1 = qs,
with q, s being large primes, then it is also hard
to compute orders.
Hence, in order to efficiently compute primitive
roots, one should choose the field modulus p for the
verification polynomials, such that p − 1 is easy to
factor. One such way is choosing p − 1 as a smooth
number (i.e. a number that factors into small primes);
however, notice that efficient computation of discrete
logarithms can be carried out in a multiplicative
group of smooth size, thanks to the Silver-Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm [35].
Definition 4.1 (Safe primes, Sophie Germain primes).
Let p be a prime number; p is safe, if p−12 is also prime.
Conversely, a prime q is a Sophie Germain prime, if 2q+1
is also prime.
The number pisg(x) of Sophie Germain primes less
than a given x (or equivalently, of safe primes less
than 2x) has been conjectured [36] to be
pisg(x) =
Cx
(lnx)2
, C ≃ 1.32032 (19)
4.1 Advantages of choosing a safe prime as mod-
ulus
The are some good reasons for working in a field
having a safe prime as modulus:
• Order computation: if p is safe, p − 1 = 2q,
then any number a of the multiplicative group
Z
∗
p can have as order 2, q, or p − 1. Hence, at
most 2 exponentiations have to be performed to
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compute an order – for p prime, ap−1 is always
1, by Fermat’s theorem [31];
• Number of primitive roots: the number of prim-
itive roots in Z∗p with p safe, is:
φ(φ(p)) = φ(p− 1) = φ(2q)
= φ(2)φ(q) = q − 1
=
p− 1
2
− 1 (20)
So, by random sampling, one expects to find,
on average, a primitive root after 2 attempts.
Even better, since any primitive root g modulo
n generates all of the other ones as:
ga mod n, gcd(a, φ(n)) = 1 (21)
it is enough to choose one primitive root – for
example, the lowest one – and then compute the
others with random values a coprime to p−1 and
2, i.e.: a ∈ {3, 5, 7, , . . . , p− 2}/{q}.
Summing up, a VSS-EXP scheme exploiting safe
primes should work as follows:
• Choose as finite field F, GF (p), with p = NSP (q)
the next safe prime greater than q; the safe prime
can also be chosen as p = NSP (2bs(q));
• For each shareholder j, select a primitive root rj
of F, and generate with Lagrange interpolation a
polynomial Vj(x) over F that exponentiates all of
the other shares through rj :
Vj(si) = rj
si , i = 1, . . . , n , i 6= j (22)
• Send p, rj and the coefficients of Vj to shareholder
j via a secure private channel;
• A provided share is verified by checking if it
satisfies (22).
4.2 Prime power fields from Mersenne primes
There are some special cases of prime power fields
F = GF (2n), for which order computation is not
needed.
Lemma 4.1. Let p be the exponent of some Mersenne prime
2p− 1. Then, the multiplicative group F∗ of the finite field
F = GF (2p) contains only primitive elements, except 1.
Proof: Since the size of the group is a prime num-
ber, no element can have an exponentiation period
lower than 2p − 1, so every element greater than 1 in
the field is primitive.
Remark. If DLP and EPRP are polynomially equivalent,
or computationally related, working in groups of smooth
cardinality would result in a loss of security, since an
efficient discrete logarithm computation would lead to ef-
ficient root extraction for the exponentiating polynomial.
Instead, using safe primes of high Hamming weight 5 6
would remain a good choice, since the derived groups are
not suitable – at least as of this writing – for efficient
logarithm computation. With random search, safe primes
up to 2048 bits can be found in a few minutes on modern
CPUs. Moreover, lists of bigger safe primes are publicly
available online, for example the one in [37].
Remark. Computation of primitive elements in prime
power fields GF (pk) requires finding a primitive polyno-
mial over GF (p). A list of primitive polynomials for binary
fields GF (2k) up to degree k = 5000 (and, in particular,
for Mersenne exponents in that range) is given in [38].
5 INFORMATION RATES
In this Section we discuss the amount of verification
data sent to each shareholder by the dealer for both
the VSS-EXP and VSS-EXP-SSP schemes, and compare
them against Feldman’s scheme.
5.1 VSS-EXP
• Public parameters: q (p1 = NSP (q) is uniquely
determined) or bs(q), if p1 = NSP (2
bs(q)) —
bs(bs(q)) bits;
• Private security parameter: rj – at most bs(p1)
bits;
• Polynomial coefficients: at most (n − 1) · bs(p1)
bits.
5.2 VSS-EXP-SSP
• Public parameters: w (p2 = NSP (2
w) is uniquely
determined) – bs(w) bits;
• Private security parameter: rj – at most bs(p2)
bits;
• Polynomial coefficients: at most (n − 1) · bs(p2)
bits.
The total amount of bits is then limited by:
bs(bs(q)) + n · bs(p1) (23)
for VSS-EXP and
bs(w) + n · bs(p2) (24)
for VSS-EXP-SSP.
5.3 Comparison with other commitment-based
schemes
In the following, we compare our schemes against
Feldman’s scheme (2.2). We do not take into account
Pedersen’s (2.3), owing to the fact that, as already
discussed, its verification data is bigger than Feld-
man’s. Moreover, we do not compare our schemes
5. The Hamming weight of a bitstring is the number of its bits
set to 1.
6. For low Hamming weight safe prime moduli, a specialized
algorithm, SNFS – Special Number Field Sieve –, can compute
discrete logarithms more efficiently than in the general case.
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against Benaloh’s (2.4), since that scheme requires a
huge number of polynomials, corresponding to a lot
of verification data. We also disregard set coherence
(2.5) since it requires for a (t, n) threshold scheme a
coalition consisting ofm > t shareholders, and cheater
detection/identification is performed by comparing
the secrets reconstructed by all of the possible subsets
of t out of m shareholders, thus requiring a greater
number of reconstruction operations.
The scheme proposed by Feldman outputs the fol-
lowing verification data, taking as input a polynomial
y(x) with t coefficients from GF (q), of maximum size
bs(q) each:
• Two public parameters p, q, whose size depends
on the computational effort needed to solve a
DLP instance: as of this writing, p should be at
least 2048 bits long;
• t commitments in Z∗p, each one of maximum
bitsize bs(p).
The total amount of data that each shareholder must
know in order to verify a share is:
bs(p) + bs(p)t = (t+ 1)bs(p) = K(t+ 1)bs(q) (25)
where K = bs(p)
bs(q) denotes the bit expansion factor
from Zq to Zp. Note that q is not considered in
the summation, since this datum is a parameter of
the Shamir’s scheme instance to be verified, and not
properly of the VSS scheme.
The information rate for a commitment scheme
is computed as the ratio between the total size of
commitments, and the quantity of data for which they
are computed. For Feldman’s scheme, it is:
R =
bs(p)(t+ 1)
bs(q)t
= K
t+ 1
t
(26)
This rate varies depending on the secret’s size: for
example, for a 160-bit secret, K = 2048160 = 12.8, so the
rate would be very high; a better rate can be obtained
with longer secrets, and higher threshold values.
Regarding the VSS-EXP family, the total amount
of data to be committed depends on the number of
shareholders n in a secret sharing session; assuming
shares in GF (q), this quantity is limited by bs(q)n bits.
The rates can then be computed as:
R
V SS EXP
=
bs(p1)
bs(q)
(27)
and
R
V SS EXP SSP
=
bs(p2)
bs(q)
≃
bs(p1)
2bs(q)
(28)
Clearly, since, as of this writing, no better methods
than exhaustive search are known to solve EPRP, no
additional lower bounds are imposed on the size of
committed data for VSS-EXP, so that the computed
rates should result, in general, much lower than the
DLP-based commitments counterparts, at least for
moderate secret sizes (128 ∼ 256 bits).
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented new verification extensions en-
hancing arbitrary secret sharing schemes by adding
cheater detection capabilities. Our main effort was de-
voted to reducing the amount of verification data for a
secret sharing scheme without worsening the security
properties; a new computational problem, EPRP, sup-
posed to be harder than the DLP, has been introduced,
but the derived verification schemes, missing the ho-
momorphic property, are not extensible to additional
shareholders, and the dealer must be a trusted entity,
since any malicious behaviour of this party cannot be
detected. Further research should be carried out on
the possibility of modifying the proposed problem in
order to augment it with the homomorphic property,
so that a resulting VSS scheme would present share-
holder extensibility, and to investigate if this kind of
problem can be also exploited in interactive proofs
for authenticating the dealer’s integrity and in public-
key based cryptosystems. Another possible direction
for future work could regard investigating additional
runtime efficiency refinements. Finally, proving the
NP-hardness of EPRP by deriving a suitable poly-time
reduction would result in a substantial breakthrough
in computer science.
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